已持续两年多的俄乌冲突,近期突然迎来了新的变局:俄罗斯5月14日突然更换国防部长,英国炒作中国“对俄售卖致命武器”立即遭到美国打脸,普京也在5月23日签署总统令,允许使用美国在俄资产补偿俄方损失。在战场上,俄罗斯也持续取得进展,重新攻入哈尔科夫州北部地区。与此同时,7日正式就任新一任期的普京将如何持续推动俄罗斯经济转型,也成为外界关注的焦点之一。

近日,在北京对话与联合国南方中心联合举办的“金砖国家货币和金融体系改革”对话会期间,北京对话秘书长韩桦对话俄罗斯瓦尔代俱乐部项目总监、俄罗斯高等经济大学教授奥列格·巴拉巴诺夫(Oleg Barabanov),讨论了俄罗斯“转向东方”战略及中俄关系,俄乌冲突期间的俄罗斯经济转型,普京的新一任期施政方向,即将在俄举办的金砖峰会等话题。

巴拉巴诺夫出席“金砖国家货币和金融体系改革”对话会

【采访/北京对话秘书长韩桦,翻译/李泽西】

韩桦:俄乌军事行动持续了近两年半,俄罗斯的经济结构也在发生变化,从出口自然资源为基础的经济结构转变为更加多元化的经济发展结构。这是我的理解。您能否细谈这一点,以及如何预判俄罗斯的经济未来?

奥列格·巴拉巴诺夫:是的,没错。在我看来,我更愿意跟中国人谈这个问题,因为中国读者会更容易理解这个问题。因为俄罗斯在苏联解体后,共产党不再领导国家,经济上就一直遵循新自由主义模式。因此,国家对实体产业的大型投资都相当有限。

当然,在石油和天然气勘探领域,国家和私人投资都相当可观,但对于所有其他实体产业、机械制造、各种商品的生产,国家投资和倡议都是有限的。我们政府遵循新自由主义模式,将其作为稳定市场金融、阻止通货膨胀率等的首要公理,而所有对实体产业的投资都被认为是共产主义的不良遗产。

因此,这不仅是一个基于政治经济考虑的决策,不幸的是,这也是一个意识形态产物。现在,在乌克兰军事行动开始后,我国政府被迫向实体产业投资,当然主要是军事生产,但我们已经可以看到军事投资外溢到民用生产部门。

很多人都感到惊讶,在美国和欧洲的制裁压力下,俄罗斯经济现在表现得如此地好。但是,我们之所以能在制裁下经济发展良好,其中一个关键的原因也许正是政府 30年来首次开始投资实体产业。事实上,我们的新任国防部长别洛乌索夫先生曾任第一副总理,他就大力倡导投资工业,是重要的思想家。

俄罗斯新防长别洛乌索夫(资料图)

俄罗斯政府中有两派,一派是新自由主义者,只关注宏观金融问题,另一派则主张促进对工业项目的投资,别洛乌索夫就是第二派的一员,至少是公开支持对工业的投资。也许这也是他作为国防部长,在这个新职位上所需要的技能,即协调军事工业的预算支出。

韩桦 :所以你的意思是,在过去30年里,你们已经为实体产业打下了坚实的基础。由于战争,军费开支的溢出效应自然会产生一些经济成果,对吗?

奥列格·巴拉巴诺夫:没错。


韩桦:还有别洛乌索夫就是这一进程背后的推动者。另外,普京连任总统标志着俄罗斯在困难的时间段保持了稳定,您如何展望未来六年?

奥列格·巴拉巴诺夫:可以肯定的是,他的连任得票率相当高,因为在之前几次连任期间,他的得票率约为70%,而现在俄罗斯中央选举委员会宣布他得到87%的选票,比过去高约17%。官方解释说,在当前的地缘政治形势下,民众愈发支持总统。

当地时间4月18日,普京成功连任后召开记者会

对于未来规划,普京有一个习惯,在新任期开始后,他会立即发布一系列总统令,提出他的中期经济愿景,应对未来六年可能会出现的问题。普京的就职日通常是5月 7日,这些法令也都是在5月发布的,我们称之为 "五月法令"。最新的五月法令也已发布,其中普京就如何发展经济和社会提出了一些愿景。

他承诺,军费开支比例的增长不应牺牲社会经济领域的支出,这些开支不会削减。事实上,在今年五月的法令中,有一些支持家庭、支持学校教育、支持医疗和其他领域的大型项目。

现在最重要的是这些五月法令的执行情况,因为俄罗斯专家对于过去的五月法令是否得到完全实施有不同的看法;如果未能实施,我们就要研究为什么。至于五月法令背后雄心勃勃的新计划,问题是如何才能有效实现。

韩桦:俄罗斯有没有开始考虑“后普京时代”会是什么样的?

奥列格·巴拉巴诺夫:目前而言没有,因为他连任的得票率非常高,他又有了六年的任期。当然,我们有反对派圈子,他们中的许多人在战争开始后就移民出俄罗斯,他们对普京的看法当然不太一样。但在俄罗斯国内,至少在公开层面、主流媒体和主流Telegram频道等其他社交媒体上,我们暂时看不到任何替代人选,没有人被提议作为替代人选。因此,目前我看不到有什么变数。

韩桦:普京此次访华期间,在超级繁忙的行程中,他甚至来到了哈尔滨,去了哈尔滨工业大学。这是俄罗斯转向东方战略的一部分吗?您认为转向东方战略的优先事项有哪些?

奥列格·巴拉巴诺夫:我很高兴俄罗斯官方代表团以最高级别访问了哈尔滨,因为中国东北的三个地区,黑龙江和其他两个省,与俄罗斯西伯利亚和俄罗斯远东地区有很深的联系。我们已经在省一级的私营企业之间开展了一些共同的经济项目。重要的是要扩大我们已有的相当深厚的农业合作、交通合作基础。中国东北地区和俄罗斯西伯利亚地区之间就有这样的合作。

普京在哈尔滨工业大学与机器人握手

我知道两国在地方层级经常互派代表团进行访问和会谈,两国的州长和省长也进行了良好的接触。如果这些接触都能得到最高政治层面的支持,当然,这对两国都是有益的,可促进现有项目。“转向东方”有两个层面,一个在全球、地缘政治和地缘经济层面上转向东方。另一个是在地方层面转向东方,这也相当重要。

韩桦:那么合作的优先事项是什么,农业还是交通?

奥列格·巴拉巴诺夫:可能是其中一项,因为我们在农产品进出口、谷物、大豆等食品行业已经有了相当强的合作。

交通也相当重要。几年前,黑河和布拉戈维申斯克之间的黑龙江上新建了一座大桥。我们还应关注开发中俄边境的西部,因为我们有50公里的一小段边境线,一边是俄罗斯的阿尔泰共和国,一边是中国新疆省。当时有铺设天然气管道的想法,也有修建公路的想法,后来这些项目很多都不知不觉地停止了。我来自阿尔泰地区,所以现在我希望我们不只开展跨黑龙江的合作,还应该发展我们西段边境的合作。我对很多项目的背景故事都较为了解,希望它们现在也能得到发展。

韩桦:这对俄罗斯来说是一个非常具有战略意义的举动,因为这意味着要背向西方,背向欧洲,转而面对东方国家,包括作为最重要战略伙伴的中国。那么从长远来看,这种转向东方的战略会持续下去吗?

奥列格·巴拉巴诺夫:是的。至少我希望如此,因为此前几十年来,俄罗斯一直在宣传我们必须转向东方,不能完全面向西方,主要即欧盟。

转向东方实际上主要是指转向中国,因为我们有几千公里的共同边界,我们有着共同的价值观,有着良好的政治氛围,有许多发展合作的项目。

实际上,直到2022年,俄罗斯仍然面向西方,主要的经济努力是发展与欧盟的合作。

事实上,俄罗斯与欧盟的进出口量当时约占俄罗斯对外贸易总量的一半。我记得大约10年前,在普京总统和习近平主席的一次会晤中,他们提出了中俄外贸额应达到 1000亿美元的想法。差不多十年前,这个目标被认为过高了,当时我们的双边外贸额仅约600亿。但现在,中俄之间的贸易额已达2200亿美元,超出10年前目标的两倍多。这些数字表明,现在俄罗斯对促进与中国在经济方面的合作有着极大的兴趣。此外,我们还在发展与亚洲其他经济大国的经济关系,与印度和其他国家的关系也在不断发展。

2022年开通的黑龙江大桥

韩桦:有一种说法是,中国和俄罗斯可以共同努力,帮助世界找到办法解决当前难题。甚至还有人提到,中国和俄罗斯可以成为两个引擎,帮助解决去全球化问题,与广大的全球南方国家共同努力,走出所谓的“小院高墙”局面。您对此有何看法?

奥列格·巴拉巴诺夫:正如我所说的,俄罗斯非常感谢中国,感谢中国社会,感谢你们在当前地缘政治局势中采取的立场。没有人指望中国会与俄罗斯一起在战壕中与西方直接交战,但我们赞赏中国对和平倡议的平衡态度,以及促进构建新世界秩序的总体愿景——不过我们用了30年的“新世界秩序”一词似乎被赋上负面的含义了。

我们真正需要的是共同愿景,如何构建和组织一个更美好的世界。而中国已经有了非常详尽的外交政策战略,我记得习近平主席在二十大报告中有很大一部分是关于外交政策的。中国外交政策的愿景、目标和价值观,大部分与俄罗斯的外交理念一样。从这个意义上讲,我们可以说是天然的合作伙伴。因此,中俄合作可以成为构建更美好未来世界格局的全球战略中心。

我认为美国人和欧洲人目前的对华政策非常愚蠢。如果你有两个对手,与其中之一的军事冲突已经公开化了,即俄罗斯与西方,那么你至少应该停止对第二个对手施压。如果他们的外交政策不由意识形态和教条主义左右,他们应该停止对中国施压,哪怕只是为了破坏俄罗斯与中国的关系。但他们没有这样做,反而加强了对中国的压力,继续在台湾挑衅,比如佩洛西窜访台湾等等。

我所说的不是俄罗斯的宣传,但我认为这两年中国人民、中国社会和中国媒体已经明白,中国肯定会成为美国的下一个目标。俄罗斯现在是美国的主要对手,但美国的所有举动、政策以及欧洲的政策都向我们表明,中国肯定会成为他们的下一个目标。因此,这意味着俄罗斯和中国应该成为朋友。

韩桦:但是等到俄乌冲突结束,俄罗斯是否会再度将西方视为经济等方面的伙伴乃至朋友?

奥列格·巴拉巴诺夫:这是个好问题,因为我记得大约10到15年前,当俄罗斯提倡转向东方的政策时,我的一些中国同事、中国专家质问我们称,现在你们与西方、与美国、与欧盟的关系都不太好,所以你们才会决定转向东方,但如果哪一天你们与欧盟、与美国的关系得到恢复,你们当天就会抛弃中国。

他们当时的质疑是有道理的,因为正如我此前所说,当时俄罗斯政治主要是面向西方的,在经济上是以欧盟为中心的,因此许多俄罗斯精英过去乃至现在都希望融为西方一部分。他们一些人的孩子和妻子住在西方国家,但除了个别特例之外,没有俄罗斯精英的孩子或妻子在中国。这一切都意味着中国质疑俄罗斯的转向东方战略是有道理的。

但我认为,在当前公开战争仍在继续、俄罗斯与西方关系完全破裂的情况下,已不可能恢复过往的关系。至少俄罗斯外交部曾多次正式表示,未来不会恢复俄欧关系,因为俄罗斯会记住西方的态度。因此,我希望我们不会再次转向西方,我们要履行对中国朋友的承诺和义务。

韩桦:今年10月,金砖国家峰会将在俄罗斯喀山举行,俄罗斯在今年金砖国家峰会上的目标是什么?比如针对西方制裁的金融合作?

奥列格·巴拉巴诺夫:俄罗斯政府、部委和非政府组织都在为这次峰会做准备,这次峰会被视为今年俄罗斯外交政策的重大活动。每次金砖国家峰会的议程总是相当广泛的,主席国的总结报告、峰会后的宣言,长达数十页, 俄罗斯也在积极做准备。

我认为,关键的政治问题可能聚焦在加强金砖国家之间的团结上,因为我们刚扩员。新成员国的领导人需要适应金砖五国现有的议程架构,而俄罗斯可以提出加强成员之间的团结,这也可以在其他国家担任轮值主席国期间得到进一步发展。

金砖组织在象征意义上是非常重要的,象征非西方国家之间的协议。金砖峰会的宣言对于促进一套新的价值观、合作原则、促进国际关系中的公正与平等、促进消除贫困等都是非常重要的,在非西方国家之间提出一些新的倡议。

2024俄罗斯金砖峰会logo

金砖国家与许多其他平台相比,比如与西方的七国集团相比,仍处于起步阶段。我认为,重要的是加强金砖国家成员内部的团结。因为在当前形势下,如果一个国际组织想在全球层面发挥有效作用,需要的不只是出台好听的声明,还需要成员之间的政治团结。

最后,在经济方面,金砖国家的金融机构新开发银行已成立数年,我们应进一步推进去美元化,并不是现在就完全放弃美元,但去年金砖五国的总统们已经提出增加相互贸易的本币结算比例。金砖国家财政部长的相关特别报告预计也将在俄罗斯金砖峰会期间发布。

以下为英文原文:

Han Hua: This military operation has lasted almost like two year and a half. Russia's economy is also shifting its structure from more natural resources based, to a more diverse economic development structure. This is what I understand. Can you elaborate a little bit on this and how to foresee the economic future for Russia.

Oleg Barabanov: Yes, that's true. From my personal point of view, it’s better that we discuss it among us, the Chinese audience would understand more. Because Russia, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and after the Communist Party stopped being the leadership of the country, Russia economically always followed the neoliberal model. So large scale state investment into real industries were quite limited. Now, for oil and gas exploration there were quite significant investments, both state and private. For all real industries, for machine building, for production of various goods, the state investment, the state initiative to invest were limited or almost non existent, and all our governments just follow the neoliberal model as the first axiom on market financial stability, to stop the inflation rate and so on, and all the investment into real industries were considered as a bad communist heritage. And so, it was not only a political economic decision, it was unfortunately an ideological decision. And now, after the start of the military operation in Ukraine, our government was forced to invest into real industries, mainly to the military production, but we can already see a spillover from the military investments into the civilian production sector.

30 years after the end of the communist rule in Russia, our government started to invest into the real industries. Many people are surprised that the Russian economy now behaves quite well, quite effective under sanctions, under pressure of American and European sanctions; but maybe one of the key answers why we became quite effective under sanctions, it is exactly that the government started for the first time in 30 years to invest in real industries. And in fact, Mr Belousov, our new minister of defense, he was the first deputy prime minister, and he was the key protagonist, the key ideologists in a good sense of the word, of investing into industries. Because there are two factions within our governmental circles, one is neoliberal, just focusing of macro financial things; another one was the idea to promote the investment into industrial projects, and Belousov was one of them, at least what we could see publicly, he supported investment into the industries. And maybe those skills will be useful to his new position as a minister of defense, to coordinate budget spending into military industries.

Han Hua: Very interesting. So you mean that in the past 30 years that actually you have made solid foundation into real industries. And because of the war or the military operation, it just creates some natural results because of the military spending and because of the spillover of the military spending, right?

Oleg Barabanov: Yeah, that's true.

Han Hua: And the economist who's now the Defense Minister is the driver behind all the processes. So let me ask you this: Putin’s reelections as president signals very strong stability during a very difficult time in your country. What do you think we can expect over the next six years?

Oleg Barabanov: It's true that the figures of his electoral result were quite high, because usually for his last reelections, the figures were about 70% in his support. Now the central electoral commission proclaimed that the result was 87%. So more or less 15%, 17% higher. And officially it was explained that there is a growing support for the president during the current geopolitical situation.

For the plans, Putin has a habit immediately after the start of his new term to publish a series of presidential decrees of his medium term economic vision, on what could be a problem for the next six years. Because the day of inauguration is traditionally May 7, and all those decrees are published in May as well, we name them the May decrees. And so the newest May decree was published; in there is the vision of the president on how to develop the economy and society. He promised that the budget spending to the social sphere, to social economic sphere should not be diminished because of the growing percentage of the military spending. And in fact, in this May decree, there are some large scale projects on the family, on support of the families, on support of the schooling, on support of medicine, to other sectors. So now what is important is the fulfillment of those May decrees, because we have quite diverging remarks in the Russian experts sphere, how the results of the previous May decrees were achieved or not achieved in full, and if not, why were they not achieved. As for the new ambitious program behind the May decrees, the question is how it could be achieved effectively.

Han Hua: Is there any talk or consideration of post Putin?

Oleg Barabanov: For the moment, I think no, because he was reelected with a very high result, now he will have six years more, at least within Russia. Sure, we have the opposition circles and many of them have emigrated from Russia after the start of the war, and sure they have quite divergent views on Putin, but within the country, at least in the public sphere, at least the mainstream media, mainstream Telegram channels and other spheres of social media, we can’t see any alternative for the moment; at least nobody was proposed as an alternative. So for the moment, I don't see that there will be some new event.

Han Hua: During Putin's visit this time, during his super busy schedule, he even made it to Harbin, and went to Harbin Institute of technology. Does this indicate that this is an integral part of Putin's turn to east strategy? And what do you think of the priorities of this turn to east strategy?

Oleg Barabanov: First, let's start with Harbin in Heilongjiang province. Sure, that's very important. And I'm very glad that now the official Russian delegation visited Harbin at the highest level, because three regions of the Chinese Northeast, Heilongjiang and two other provinces, are quite deeply connected to the Russian Siberia, to the Russian far east. We already had some common economic projects at the provincial level between private companies. What is important is to enlarge already existing deep economic background of agriculture cooperation, transport cooperation there are between the Chinese northeast and the Russian Siberia.

And I know that there are many visits and many talks of delegations at the regional levels. The governors of the regions had good contact. And now, if all this could be supported from the highest political level, it would be useful for both countries. And today it could be useful to promote the existing projects.

Look east has two dimensions, one is more or less global, to look east globally and geopolitically and geoeconomically. And another is to look east at the local level, which is also quite important.

Han Hua: What are the priorities in your opinion? Agriculture or transportation?

Oleg Barabanov: Could be one of them, because we already had quite comparatively strong cooperation in export-import of agricultural products, in grain, soybeans, some other products in the food sector.

The transportation sector is also quite important. A couple of years ago, the new bridge was built over the Heilongjiang river between Heihe and Blagoveshchensk. And there are some other projects for transportation. What is important is also to develop the western part of the Russian Chinese border, because we have small segment of our border, 50 km in the west, which is the Altai Republic of Russia and a part of Xinjiang in China; we already had several projects for developing the western segment of our border. There were ideas of gas pipeline, there were ideas to build a road. Then many of those projects were stopped somehow. And I hope now, because I’m from the Altai region, I'm personally interested in developing the cooperation not only in Heilongjiang but the Western part of our border. And I know the story of many of those projects and hope they could be developed now as well.

Han Hua: This is a very strategic move for Russia because it means that you're turning back to the West, to Europe, you're facing the eastern countries, including China as the most important strategic partner. So in the long term, will this turn to east strategy be sustained?

Oleg Barabanov: Yes. At least I hope so because previously, already for several decades, Russia promoted the idea that we must look east, must not focus all out policy economy on the west and mainly the EU.

Look east, it means mainly, frankly speaking, look at China. Because we have the common border of several thousand kilometers. We have shared values and a good political atmosphere between our countries. There are many projects to develop Russian Chinese cooperation. Until 2022, Russia still was anchored to the west and the main economic efforts were done to develop the cooperation with the EU.

In fact, the figures of our export import operations with the European Union consisted of more or less a half of our foreign trade in general. And I remember about 10 years ago, at one meeting between Putin and Xi Jinping, they proposed the idea that the volume of the foreign trade between Russia and China should be aimed at one hundred billion dollars. And more or less ten years ago, it was considered as too ambitious because we had between 50, 60, maybe seventy billion dollars of bilateral foreign trade. But now we have 220 billion dollars of the foreign trade between Russia and China. So those over-ambitious aim of 10 years ago was surpassed twice and more. These figures show that now Russia had a vital interest in promoting cooperation with China in all economic spheres. Also, we are developing our economic relations with other big economic powers in Asia; with India, we have the growing figures, and with other countries, so this strategy started to go.

Han Hua: There is a saying about how China and Russia can jointly work together to help the world to find solutions to the current disorder and difficulties. And there is even mentioning about China and Russia can be two engines, to help solve the deglobalization’s difficult situation, by working together with the vast Global South to break out from the so called high fence small yard situation. What's your take on this?

Oleg Barabanov:  As I already said, Russia is really grateful to China, to the Chinese society, for your position now in the current geopolitical situation. Nobody expects that China could join Russia at the barricade in direct fighting with the West. But we appreciate the balanced Chinese approach to the peace initiatives and also to promote the general new vision for making the new world order, because the new world order is a very bad phrase, we’ve used it for 20 or 30 years. But what we really need is the real common vision of how the better world could be structured, how it could be built and organized. And China already have that very deeply elaborated foreign policy strategy, in your last Congress of the Communist Party of China; I remember the report of Mr Xi Jinping had very large section on foreign policy, on the visions, goals and values of the foreign policy of China, and Russia shares almost all of them. So in that sense, we are more or less natural partners because our foreign policy strategies and goals are shared or well understood by the other. So in that sense, Russia China cooperation could be at the center of the new global strategy, how we can build a better world for the future.

And also it's very important because for me personally, the Americans and the Europeans are very stupid in their current policy on China. Because for example, if you have two enemies or two adversaries, and with one of them you are already in open military conflict, this is Russia and the West, then at least for the moment, stop pressing the second adversary. If they be clear in their foreign policy and not be dogmatic, they could stop pressing China, at least in this situation, just with the aim to break the relations between Russia and China. But they didn't. They exactly strengthened their pressure on China. They continued the provocations in Taiwan, remember the visit of Nancy Pelosi on the province of Taiwan and so on. And because of that, I'm not expressing the Russian propaganda, but I think that the people in China and the society in China and media in China in these two years already understood that China definitely will be the next target for the United States. Russia is the key target now. But all the American activity, all the American policy and European as well, shows for us that China definitely will be the next target for them. So it all means that Russia and China should be friends.

Han Hua: But when the war ends, will Russia still think about Europe or the west as a friend or partner to work with economically, for example?

Oleg Barabanov: Well, it's a good question, because I remember about 10 to 15 years ago when Russia promoted the policy to look east, some of my Chinese colleagues, the Chinese experts ask me and ask other Russian, okay, now you have more or less bad relations with the West, with United States, with European Union. So you decided to look east. But let's imagine that one day your relations with the EU, with the US will be restored. You will forget China immediately. In one day, in one night. And they had reason to say so, because as I already tried to explain you, the real Russian politics was mainly western centric, EU centric in economy, and so the desire to be part of the west was and is quite a diffuse topic among the Russian elites. So some of them have their children, their wives in Western countries, in Europe, but how many children or wives of Russian elites are in China? I think nobody, or rarest exceptions. It all means that question, should China trust Russia in our Look east policy, was reasonable.

But I think that now, in the current situation when the open war is going on, and the relations are broken totally between Russia and the West, restoring the old nostalgic relations with previous matters would not be possible. At least officially, our Foreign Ministry expressed several times that there will not be the restoration of Russia-EU relations in the future, because Russia will remember the opposition in the current situation. So I hope that we will not turn west once more, and we fulfill our obligations and our promises to the Chinese friends.

Han Hua: What's your goal for the BRICS summit? Would there be, for example, any financial collaborations against the sanctions from the west?

Oleg Barabanov: Yes, sure. This year, Russia will be hosting the BRICS summit, will be done in October in Kazan, the capital of the Republic of Tatarstan in the Russian Federation. And now I see that both our governmental circles, our ministries and our NGOs are preparing for the summit. It is considered as the key foreign policy event in Russia for this year. And among the key topics, because the agenda, you understand, is always quite wide in the BRICS summit, if you look at the presidency conclusion, memoranda, declarations after the summits, there are about several dozens of pages, several dozens of points. So a very large, a very detailed documents.

But the key political question as I personally see it could be focused on the greater solidarity between the BRICS countries, because now we have enlarged it, new members are invited to join the club. Their leaders will be present as the new BRICS members. They have to adapt to already existing structure of the agenda of the BRICS.

The solidarity of the members is the key factor that could be proposed by Russia, and it could be developed in other presidencies of the BRICS. Because for the moment, if we see BRICS as an institutional structure, it's very important on the symbolic level, as a symbol of non western agreement, or cooperation among the major non western countries, and all those annual declarations of BRICS summits are very important to promote a new set of values, to promoting a new set of principles for cooperation, for justice and Equality in international relations, for the fight against poverty and so on, and to propose some new decisions within the non-Western countries.

Several years ago, BRICS launched the New Development Bank as a new financial institution. Comparing BRICS with many other formats, like with G7 within the West, we're still at the beginning of our process. And what is important from my personal point of view is to strengthen the internal solidarity within the BRICS members. Because if an international structure could be effective in the global level now, in the current situation, it has to be strong, and the strength of the organizations means not only the good symbolic letters written in the declarations, it means the real solidarity in the real politics among the members. So that how I see it, but I'm not the decision makers there.

The first thing will be to strengthen solidarity. And another economic one, just to conclude, would be to develop further, not renounce the US dollar completely now, but a year ago, the presidents of the BRICS already proposed the idea that payment for commercial contracts within their countries could be done in their national currencies. And now the special report of the ministers of finances of the BRICS countries is expected during the summit. So how it could be done smoothly, not to diminish the potential for cooperation, but just to strengthen.